New Delhi [India], September 4 (ANI): The Delhi High Court has observed that while DNA evidence may conclusively establish paternity and the fact of sexual intercourse, it cannot by itself determine whether the relationship was consensual or non-consensual.
Justice Madhu Jain made the observation while dismissing an appeal filed by a prosecutrix against the acquittal of a man accused of repeatedly raping her, administering an intoxicant, committing unnatural sexual acts and extending threats.
“The gravity of the accusation cannot substitute the standard of proof required in a criminal trial,” the Court said, adding that where the evidence permits a reasonable view consistent with innocence, the benefit must go to the accused.
The Court upheld the October 2024 judgment of a Dwarka court acquitting the accused of offences under Sections 376(2)(n), 377, 328, 506 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code.
The prosecutrix had alleged that the accused, known to her family, had repeatedly established physical relations with her against her wishes since 2017 by threatening and inducing her. She also alleged that on one occasion she was administered an intoxicating substance before being sexually assaulted.
She subsequently gave birth to a child in June 2019. A DNA examination established that the accused was the biological father of the child.
However, Justice Jain said the DNA report, though significant, only established the fact of sexual intercourse and paternity.
“However, the DNA report by itself does not establish the circumstances in which such intercourse took place, nor does it determine whether the relationship was consensual or non-consensual,” the Court observed.
The real question, the High Court said, was whether the prosecution had proved the absence of consent and established the offence of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court also made significant observations on the evidentiary value of a prosecutrix’s testimony, holding that the statutory presumption regarding absence of consent does not make such testimony immune from judicial scrutiny.
While recognising that a prosecutrix’s sole testimony can form the basis of conviction, the Court said such evidence must still inspire confidence and withstand judicial examination.
“The principle that the testimony of the prosecutrix can, in an appropriate case, form the sole basis of conviction, does not dispense with the requirement that such testimony must inspire confidence,” the Court said.
It added that courts are not required to ignore material contradictions and inconsistencies merely because the allegations concern a sexual offence.
Importantly, Justice Jain cautioned courts against judging a prosecutrix’s conduct through stereotypical notions of how a victim of sexual assault ought to behave.
“Conduct of a prosecutrix in a sexual offence cannot be judged on the basis of stereotypical notions of how a victim ought to behave,” the Court observed.
At the same time, it clarified that the conduct of parties and surrounding circumstances cannot be treated as wholly irrelevant when the court has to assess competing versions and determine whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
The High Court noted that the trial court had considered the evidence cumulatively rather than treating any single circumstance as decisive.
The Court found that the trial court had identified several material inconsistencies in the prosecutrix’s versions concerning the alleged administration of an intoxicant, her state of consciousness during the first alleged assault, the circumstances surrounding her pregnancy and her husband’s alleged doubts regarding the child’s paternity.
It also noted inconsistencies regarding a police call allegedly made after the husband found the prosecutrix and accused in a compromising position.
The allegations that the accused had taken nude photographs and videos and threatened to circulate them were also unsupported by electronic evidence, the Court noted. The alleged photographs, videos and chats were neither produced nor recovered during forensic examination of the accused’s mobile phone.
Rejecting the prosecutrix’s argument that she had no reason to falsely implicate the accused and expose herself to social stigma, the Court made another significant observation.
“Such an argument, however, cannot substitute proof,” Justice Jain said.
“The Court is required to decide the criminal charge on the evidence led before it and not on an assumption regarding the reasons which may or may not motivate a person to lodge a complaint.”
The High Court reiterated the settled principle governing appeals against acquittal, holding that an appellate court cannot interfere merely because another possible view of the evidence exists.
An acquittal can be reversed only where the findings are perverse, manifestly illegal, based on a misreading of material evidence or where guilt is the only possible conclusion, the Court said. In the present case, the Court held that the trial court’s view was a reasonably possible one based on the evidence available on record.
“The fact that another view may also be possible is not sufficient to justify interference in an appeal against acquittal,” the Court observed, noting that the strengthened presumption of innocence operates in favour of an acquitted accused. Finding no perversity or illegality in the trial court’s judgment, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the acquittal. (ANI)
DNA proof of paternity does not, by itself, establish rape; "gravity of accusation cannot substitute standard of proof": Delhi HC
